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Abstract—This paper investigates a multiple unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) enabled cooperative secure transmission scheme
in the presence of multiple potential eavesdroppers. Specifically,
multiple source UAVs (SUAVs) send confidential information to
multiple legitimate ground users and in the meantime multiple
jamming UAVs (JUAVs) cooperatively transmit interference sig-
nals to multiple eavesdroppers in order to improve the legitimate
users’ achievable secrecy rate. By taking into account the limited
energy budget of UAV, our goal is to maximize the system secrecy
energy efficiency (SEE), namely the achievable secrecy rate per
energy consumption unit, by jointly optimizing the UAV trajec-
tory, transmit power and user scheduling under the constraints
of UAV mobility as well as the maximum transmit power. The
resulting optimization problem is shown to be a non-convex and
mixed-integer fractional optimization problem, which is challeng-
ing to solve. We decompose the original problem into three sub-
problems, and then an efficient iterative algorithm is proposed by
leveraging the block coordinate descent and Dinkelbach method
in combination with successive convex approximation techniques.
Simulation results show that the proposed scheme outperforms
the other benchmarks significantly in terms of the system SEE.
Index Terms—Secure transmission, unmanned aerial vehicle,
trajectory optimization, cooperative jamming.
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are primarily
used in military purposes, such as recognition mission, surveil-
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lance mission, territory detection and others [1]. The UAVs
become more and more multi-functional and are promising for
civilian applications due to their flexibility and cost-efficiency
for wireless networks deployment [2]–[5]. The UAV’s flexible
mobility can be exploited to design a trajectory that increases
network throughput. In fact, there has been considerable
work on the implementation of UAV-enabled wireless com-
munication systems such as UAV-aided relaying, UAV-aided
ubiquitous coverage, UAV-aided information dissemination as
well as data collection, etc [6]–[15]. Among them, the works
in [6] and [7] considered that the UAV acted as the mobile
relaying to deliver the source data to a destination node. In
[8]–[11], the UAV-aided wireless coverage problem was taken
into account with the goal of either maximizing coverage
region or maximizing user experience, i.e., quality of service
(QoS). The works in [12]–[15] studied the UAV-aided data
dissemination and collection problems from the perspective
of the common throughput maximization in either downlink
or uplink transmission by optimizing UAV trajectory.
Although the UAVs leveraged in wireless communication
bring many benefits, e.g., higher throughput, better QoS, lower
delay, etc., the UAV-aided wireless communication systems
are not safe and are more vulnerable to be wiretapped by the
malicious eavesdroppers due to the high probabilistic LoS of
air-to-ground (A2G) channel [16]–[18]. By far, the research
of physical layer security (PLS) transmission in traditional
cellular networks has been widely studied based on the design
of maximizing the security rate [19]–[25]. For example, [24]
studied the secrecy rate maximization problem in the presence
of multiple eavesdroppers. Simulation results showed that with
the help of multiple jammers, the system secrecy rate was
significantly improved. In [25], the authors further studied a
secure energy efficiency optimization problem in the cognitive
radio network under the constraints of the minimum harvested
energy at energy receiver and the maximum interference
leakage at the primary network. It is worth noting that the
transmit sources such as base station and WiFi access point
are fixed. However, in the UAV-enabled PLS transmission
systems, the UAV can freely adjust its heading for executing
the missions. If the UAV flies closer to the eavesdroppers, the
confidential information is more susceptible to be encrypted.
Therefore, it imposes a new challenge to design UAV-aided
secure wireless networks. There have been a few works on
the research of the UAV-aided secure wireless networks [26]–
[31]. Specifically, the work in [26] considered a downlink
transmission system where the UAV sent the confidential
message to a legitimate ground user in the presence of a
2malicious ground eavesdropper, and a joint UAV trajectory
and transmit power was proposed to maximize the secrecy
rate. In [27], the authors considered a UAV-aided mobile
relying system to enhance the system’s PLS by jointly opti-
mizing the UAV/source transmit power and UAV trajectory.
[28] investigated a UAV-enabled mobile jamming scheme,
where a UAV was leveraged to send jamming signal to the
potential eavesdropper for maximizing the average secrecy
rate. Two UAVs applied in secure transmission systems were
investigated in [29], [30], where one UAV intended to send
the confidential message and the other UAV sent the jamming
signal by jointly optimizing the two UAVs trajectories as well
as the transmit power to maximize secrecy rate. The work
[31] further considered a worst-case secrecy rate maximization
case by assuming that the two UAVs only perfectly know the
legitimate ground user while partially know the eavesdropper’s
location.
Unfortunately, the sustainability and performance of UAV-
enabled communication systems are fundamentally limited
by the onboard energy of UAVs [32], [33]. Therefore, the
secrecy energy efficiency (SEE) of UAV-enabled communi-
cation systems, which defined as the ratio of the secrecy
rate to UAV energy consumption measured by bits/Joule,
is of paramount importance in practice. In fact, there has
considerable work on the study of the SEE in traditional PLS
systems [34]–[37]. Our work is different from the previous
studies, which considered the communication related energy.
Note that the UAV communication energy is several orders of
magnitude lower than the UAV propulsion energy consumption
[33]. Therefore, the design of SEE problem in UAV-enabled
networks still remains a new open issue. However, there only
one literature paid attention to investigating it. In [38], a UAV
is exploited to assist delivering the confidential message from
a ground source to a legitimate node in the presence of a
potential eavesdropper, in which the goal was to maximize
system SEE by jointly optimizing UAV trajectory, transmit
power, and communication scheduling. However, work [38] is
only limited to relaying, in our paper, the UAVs used as aerial
base stations are investigated.
In this paper, we consider a system where multiple source
UAVs (SUAVs) cooperatively transmit information to the legit-
imate ground users in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers.
In addition, to improve the system secrecy rate, the multiple
jamming UAVs (JUAVs) are leveraged to cooperatively send
the jamming signals to the eavesdroppers. The motivation of
using multi-UAV lies in the potential cooperative transmis-
sion ability to achieve better system performance, such as
higher secrecy rate and lower access delay. To enhance the
spectrum efficiency, we assume that all the UAVs share the
same bandwidth to communicate with the ground legitimate
users in the downlink transmission. Thus, the UAVs transmit
power should be carefully designed to mitigate the co-channel
interference. More importantly, the UAV’s propulsion energy
consumption is significantly influenced by its velocity and
acceleration. As a result, our goal is to maximize the system
SEE by jointly optimizing the UAV trajectory, transmit power,
and user scheduling under the constraints of UAV mobility
as well as maximum transmit power. Note that the work
[30] investigated the system with single SUAV and single
JUAV serving multiple legitimate ground users while does not
considered the UAV’s propulsion energy consumption. In fact,
numerical results have shown that the benefits of proposed
scheme compared with one single SUAV and single JUAV
case. To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing work
to study the energy-efficient cooperative secure transmission
in multi-UAV enabled wireless communication systems. The
main contributions are summarized as follows.
• We propose an energy-efficient cooperative secure trans-
mission scheme in the multi-UAV enabled wireless com-
munication systems. We take into account maximizing the
system secrecy rate and minimizing the UAV propulsion
energy consumption, and trade off them by formulating
the SEE maximization problem subject to the constraints
of UAV mobility as well as maximum transmit power.
• We develop a three-layer iterative algorithm to solve
the non-convex and mixed integer fractional optimization
problem by using block coordinate descent, Dinkelbach
method, and successive convex approximation (SCA)
techniques. Specifically, for any given UAV trajectory and
transmit power, the user scheduling is optimally solved
with low computational complexity. For any given UAV
trajectory and user scheduling, we propose an efficient
algorithm to optimize the UAV transmit power by using
the SCA techniques. For any given user scheduling and
transmit power, the UAV trajectory is obtained by apply-
ing SCA techniques and Dinkelbach method.
• The multiple SUAVs are used to cooperatively transmit
information to the legitimate users, as expected, the
achievable rate of UAV systems can be improved by opti-
mizing user scheduling and UAVs transmit power. More-
over, for enhancing the performance of UAV-enabled se-
cure transmission systems, multiple JUAVs are leveraged
to transmit the jamming signal to the eavesdroppers.
• Numerical results demonstrate the following conclusions.
First, the proposed JUAVs-aided scheme achieves signifi-
cantly higher secrecy rate compared with no JUAVs-aided
scheme. Second, the system SEE does not monotonically
increase or decrease with period time T , in contrast, the
UAV system SEE firstly increases with period time T and
then decreases with period time T . Third, the proposed
scheme outperforms the other benchmarks in terms of
SEE.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we introduce the multi-UAV enabled cooperative secure
communication systems and formulate the SEE problem. Sec-
tion III proposes an efficient iterative algorithm to solve the
formulated problem by using the block coordinate descent and
Dinkelbach method, as well as SCA techniques. In Section IV,
numerical results are presented to illustrate superiority of our
scheme. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a multiple UAVs-aided downlink secure transmis-
sion systems, which consist of a set K2 of K2 legitimate users
and a set K1 of K1 eavesdroppers as shown in Fig. 1. Denote
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Fig. 1. An illustration of a multi-UAV enabled cooperative secure system.
a set ofM1 JUAVs asM1 and a set ofM2 SUAVs asM2. We
assume that all the UAVs fly at a fixed altitude H , which can
be considered as the minimum altitude to avoid collision by
the infrastructure obstacles. For simplicity, the collision among
UAVs is not considered here since it can be readily extended
by adding the minimum security distance constraints as in
[13]. In addition, we assume that SUAVs and JUAVs perfectly
know the legitimate user and eavesdropper locations by proper
information exchange. This paper can be easily extended to
the case with imperfect location of the eavesdropper. Since
our main focus is to present the proposed scheme based on
UAV’s SEE to the reader in an easy-to-access manner, we
would like to restrict the current contribution to the location
perfectly known case.
For ease of exposition, a Cartesian coordinate system is
established with all the dimensions measured in meters. The
horizontal coordinates of the legitimate users k2 ∈ K2 and the
eavesdroppers k1 ∈ K1 are respectively denoted by wk2 and
wk1 . The continuous time T is equally divided into N time
slots with duration δ. As such, the horizontal coordinate of the
i-th UAV’s trajectory, velocity and acceleration over horizon
time T can be approximately denoted by N -length sequences
as {qi[n]}, {vi[n]} and {ai[n]}, i ∈ M1 ∪M2, n ∈ N =
{1, 2, ..., N}.
Different from terrestrial communications, the UAV-to-
ground channel is more likely to be dominated by LoS link,
especially for rural or sub-urban environment. Recent field
experiments by Qualcomm have verified that the UAV-to-
ground channel is indeed dominated by the LoS link for UAVs
flying above a certain altitude [39]. In addition, the LoS of
A2G channel model is also one of the considered channel
models in the recent 3GPP specification [40]. Therefore, the
air-to-ground channel power gain from UAV i, i ∈M1∪M2,
to any ground user k, k ∈ K1 ∪ K2, at time slot n can be
modeled as [6], [13], [41],
hk,i [n] =
β0
d2k,i [n]
=
β0
‖qi [n]−wk‖
2
+H2
, (1)
where dk,i [n] denotes the distance between UAV i and ground
user k within time slot n, β0 represents the reference channel
gain at d = 1m.
A. Secrecy rate
Define a binary variable xk2,m2 , which stands for that the
legitimate user k2, k ∈ K2, is served by SUAV m2, m2 ∈
M2, within time slot n if xk2,m2 = 1, otherwise, xk2,m2 =
0. Moreover, we assume that within each time slot n, one
legitimate user can be at most served by one SUAV, and each
SUAV can serve at most one legitimate user. Thus, we have
K2∑
k2=1
xk2,m2 [n] ≤ 1,m2 ∈ M2, n ∈ N , (2)
M2∑
m2=1
xk2,m2 [n] ≤ 1, k2 ∈ K2, , n ∈ N , (3)
xk2,m2 [n] ∈ {0, 1} , ∀k2,m2, n ∈ N . (4)
If the legitimate user k2 ∈ K2 is served by UAV m2 ∈ M2
at time slot n ∈ N , the achievable rate of user k2 in bps can
be expressed as
Rk2 [n] =
M2∑
m2=1
xk2,m2 [n]Rk2,m2 [n], (5)
whereRk2,m2 [n] = Blog2
(
1 +
pm2 [n]hk2,m2 [n]∑
i∈M2\{m2}∪M1
pi[n]hk2,i[n]+σ
2
)
,
pm2 [n] denotes the transmit power of SUAV m2 at time slot
n, and σ2 is the additive Gaussian white noise power.
Similarly, the achievable rate of eavesdropper k1 wiretap-
ping the user k2 at time slot n is given by
Rk1→k2 [n] =
M2∑
m2=1
xk2,m2 [n]Rk1,m2 [n], (6)
whereRk1,m2 [n] = Blog2
(
1 +
pm2 [n]hk1,m2 [n]∑
i∈M2\{m2}∪M1
pi[n]hk1,i[n]+σ
2
)
.
Therefore, the worst-case secrecy rate of user k2 ∈ K2 in
the presence ofK1 eavesdroppers over horizon time T is given
by [19], [20]
Rseck2 =
N∑
n=1
[
Rk2 [n]− max
k1∈K1
Rk1→k2 [n]
]+
, (7)
where [b]
+
= max{b, 0}.
B. UAV propulsion energy consumption
Herein, a fixed-wing UAV is employed since its flight
endurance is typically much longer than that of the rotary-
wing UAV. The total energy consumption of fixed-wing UAV
consists of two parts: UAV communication energy and UAV
propulsion energy. However, [33] shows that the UAV commu-
nication energy consumption is several orders of magnitudes
lower than the UAV propulsion energy consumption. Thus,
the UAV communication energy consumption can be ignored
compared with UAV propulsion energy consumption. Based
4on [33], the total propulsion energy consumption of UAV i
over T is given by
Ei =
N∑
n=1
(
c1‖vi [n]‖
3 +
c2
‖vi [n]‖
(
1 +
‖ai [n]‖
2
g2
))
, (8)
where g is the gravitational acceleration with nominal value
9.8m/s2, c1 and c2 are the constant parameters related to the
UAV wing area, air density and UAV’s weight [33].
C. Problem formulation
Let us define X = {xk2,m2 [n] , ∀k2,m2, n}, P =
{pi [n] , ∀i, n}, Q = {qi[n],vi[n], ai[n], ∀i, n} and N1 =
{0, 1, ..., N}. Mathematically, the problem can be formulated
as follows
(P) max
X,P,Q
K2∑
k2=1
N∑
n=1
[
Rk2 [n]− max
k1∈K1
Rk1→k2 [n]
]+
Etotal
s.t. (2), (3), (4), (9)
qi [n+ 1] = qi [n] + vi [n] δ +
1
2
ai [n] δ
2,
n ∈ N1, i ∈M1 ∪M2, (10)
vi [n+ 1] = vi [n] + ai [n] δ, n ∈ N1, i ∈ M1 ∪M2,
(11)
qi [0] = qi [N + 1] , i ∈M1 ∪M2, (12)
vi [0] = vi [N + 1] , i ∈M1 ∪M2, (13)
‖vi [n]‖ ≤ vmax, n ∈ N1, i ∈M1 ∪M2, (14)
‖ai [n]‖ ≤ amax, n ∈ N1, i ∈M1 ∪M2, (15)
0 ≤ pi [n] ≤ Pmax, i ∈M1 ∪M2, (16)
where Etotal =
∑
i∈M1∪M2
Ei; (10)-(15) denote the UAV
trajectory constraints; qi[0] and qi[N + 1] denote the initial
location and final location of UAV i ; vi[0] and vi[N + 1]
denote the initial velocity and final velocity of UAV i; (14),
(15), and (16) represent the feasible and boundary constraints
of the optimization variables.
III. ENERGY EFFICIENT ALGORITHM DESIGN FOR
MULTI-UAV SECURE TRANSMISSION
The problem (P) is a non-convex and mixed integer frac-
tional optimization problem, which is challenging to solve
due to the following reasons. First, the binary variables are
involved in objective function and constraints (2)-(4). Second,
both numerator and denominator in objective function are
non-convex, which lead to a non-convex fractional objective
function. With that in mind, we decompose the original
problem into three sub-problems, namely user scheduling
optimization, UAV transmit power optimization, and UAV
trajectory optimization. Then, an efficient iterative algorithm is
proposed via alternately optimizing these three sub-problems.
A. User scheduling optimization
In this subsection, we consider the first sub-problem for
optimizing the user scheduling X with given UAV transmit
power P and UAV trajectory Q. Then, the problem (P) can
be simplified as
(P1) max
X,Γk2 [n]
K2∑
k2=1
N∑
n=1
Γk2 [n]
s.t. (2)-(4),
Rk2 [n]− max
k1∈K1
Rk1→k2 [n] ≥ Γk2 [n] , n ∈ N , k2, (17)
where Γk2 [n] is the slack variable. It is observed that the prob-
lem (P1) is an integer optimization problem, which in general
has no efficient algorithm to solve it with low computational
complexity. A traditional method is to first relax the binary
variables into continuous variables, and then reconstruct the
binary solution by using the obtained continuous solution [13].
However, it cannot be guaranteed that the reconstructed binary
solution is the optimal solution to problem (P1). In addition,
mapping the continuous solution to the optimal binary soltuion
is a very challenging task, which has higher computational
complexity. In contrast, we can obtain the optimal scheduling
to problem (P1) based on the Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Proposed method to solve (P1)
1: for k2 = 1 to K2 do
2: for m2 = 1 to M2 do
if Rseck2,m2 [n] < 0
Set xk2,m2 [n] = 0, R
sec
k2,m2
[n] = 0.
end if
3: end for
4: end for
5: for k2 = 1 to K2 do
Step 1: compute {k2,m
∗
2} = argmax
m2
Rseck2,m2 [n], and
set xk2,m2 [n] = 0,m2 ∈M2\ {m
∗
2}.
6: end for
7: if {Rseck2,m∗2 [n] , k2 ∈ K2} == 0
Step 2: set xk2,m∗2 [n] = 0, and remove the R
sec
k2,m
∗
2
[n]
from the set {Rseck2,m∗2 [n] , k2 ∈ K2}.
8: end if
9: Define the new set {Rseck2,m∗2 [n] , k2 ∈ K
new
2 ,m
∗
2 ∈
Mnew2 }.
10: if there are more than two same index m¯y2 in the indexes
{m¯y2 ∈ M
new
2 },
Step 3: compute
{
k¯y2 , m¯
y
2
}
= argmax
k2∈Km¯y2
Rsec
k2,m¯
y
2
[n]
(Km¯y2 is the user set containing m¯
y
2).
Step 4: set xk¯y2 ,m¯
y
2
= 1, xk2,m¯y2 = 0 (k2 ∈ Km¯
y
2
\
{
k¯y2
}
),
and also remove Rsec
k2,m¯
y
2
[n] (k2 ∈ Km¯y2\
{
k¯y2
}
) from
the set {Rseck2,m∗2 [n] , k2 ∈ K
new
2 ,m
∗
2 ∈M
new
2 }.
11: end if
12: Define the new set {Rsec
k˜2,m˜2
[n] , k˜2 ∈ Krenew2 , m˜2 ∈
Mrenew2 }, and set xk˜2,m˜2 = 1 for k˜2 ∈ K
renew
2 , m˜2 ∈
Mrenew2 }.
In Algorithm 1, Rseck2,m2 [n] = Rk2,m2 [n]− maxk1∈K1
Rk1,m2 [n],
∀n, k2 ∈ K2,m2 ∈ M2. Since the problem (P1) can be split
into N parallel sub-problems, thus we can solve it separately.
For any given time slot n in the Algorithm 1, step 1 stands
5for that each legitimate user associated with the SUAV with its
local benefits maximization. In fact, step 1 obeys the constraint
(3). Step 2 makes sure that the secrecy rate is larger than zero
when the user is scheduled. Step 3 and Step 4 complies with
the constraint (2).
For the stage 1-4, the computational complexity for this
loop is K2M2. For the stage 5-6, in each loop, the complexity
for selecting the optimal m2 that maximizing R
sec
k2,m2
[n]
is M2 − 1, and thus the computational complexity for the
stage 5-6 is K2(M2 − 1). For the stage 7-8, the compu-
tational complexity for the determine statement is K2. For
the stage 10-11, the computational complexity for checking
the same m¯y2 is Cm¯y2Nm¯
y
2
, where Cm¯y2 is the number of
clusters with each cluster containing more than two same
m¯y2 (m¯
y
2 ∈ M
new
2 ), and Nm¯y2 is the cardinality of the
corresponding cluster. Note that Cm¯y2Nm¯
y
2
≤ M2. The total
computational complexity for solving (P1) by using Algo-
rithm 1 is O
(
N
(
2K2M2 + Cm¯y2Nm¯
y
2
))
.
However, for the exhaustive search method, at any time slot
n, there are P (M2,K2) scheduling choices (P is a permutation
operator). We compute the objective function results of prob-
lem (P1) with these choices (the complexity is P (M2,K2)),
and then choose the optimal one that maximize problem (P1)
(the complexity is P (M2,K2) − 1). Thus, the total com-
putational complexity for solving (P1) by using exhaustive
search method is O (N × (2P (M2,K2)− 1)) (K2 ≥M2).
Obviously, the computational complexity of our proposed
method is much lower than the exhaustive search method,
especially when N , K2, and M2 are large.
B. UAV power optimization
In this subsection, we consider the second sub-problem
(P2) for optimizing UAV transmit power P with given UAV
trajectory Q and user scheduling X , which can be written as
(P2) max
P,τk2 [n],γk2 [n]
K2∑
k2=1
N∑
n=1
τk2 [n]
s.t. Rk2 [n]− γk2 [n] ≥ τk2 [n] , n ∈ N , k2, (18)
γk2 [n] ≥ Rk1→k2 , n ∈ N , k1, k2, (19)
0 ≤ pi ≤ Pmax, i ∈ M1 ∪M2, (20)
where τk2 and γk2 are the auxiliary variables.
Problem (P2) is a non-convex optimization problem owing
to the non-convex constraints (18) and (19). To proceed,
we resort to leveraging the SCA technique to obtain an
efficient approximation solution to problem (P2). First, to
tackle the non-convex term Rk2 [n] with respect to (w.r.t.) pi[n]
in constraint (18), we apply the SCA technique to transform
Rk2 [n] into a convex form. Then, we can rewrite Rk2,m2 as
follows
Rk2,m2 [n] = R¯k2,m2 [n]− R˜k2,m2 [n] , k2 ∈ K2, (21)
where R¯k2,m2 [n] = Blog2
( ∑
i∈M1∪M2
pi [n]hk2,i [n] + σ
2
)
and R˜k2,m2 [n] = Blog2
( ∑
i∈M2\{m2}∪M1
pi [n]hk2,i [n] + σ
2
)
.
It can be seen from (21) that Rk2,m2 is a difference of two
concave functions. To proceed, by defining the set {pri [n]}
as the given local point at the r-th iteration, we have the
following result.
Lemma 1: For any given power {pri [n]}, the inequality is
hold in (22) (at the top of next page).
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A.
From Lemma 1, we can see that the R˜upk2,m2 [n] is linear
w.r.t. the power pi[n], which indicates that R˜k2,m2 [n] can be
replaced by its upper bound R˜upk2,m2 [n]. Thus, it can be readily
verified that the constraint (18) is now convex.
To address the non-convex constraint (19), the SCA tech-
nique is still applied. Similarly, for k1 ∈ K1, we can reexpress
Rk1,m2 [n] as
Rk1,m2 [n] = R¯k1,m2 [n]− R˜k1,m2 [n] , k1 ∈ K1 (23)
where R¯k1,m2 [n] = Blog2
( ∑
i∈M1∪M2
pi [n]hk1,i [n] + σ
2
)
and R˜k1,m2 [n] = Blog2
( ∑
i∈M2\{m2}∪M1
pi [n]hk1,i [n] + σ
2
)
.
It can be seen that Rk1,m2 is also a difference of two concave
function, which brings the following lemma.
Lemma 2: For any given power {pri [n]}, the inequality is
hold in (24) (at the top of next page).
Proof: The proof is similar to Lemma 1 and omitted here
for simplicity.
Therefore, with the given local point {pri [n]} and upper
bound results R˜upk2,m2 [n] and R¯
up
k1,m2
[n], we have
(P2.1) max
P,τk2 [n],γk2 [n]
K2∑
k2=1
N∑
n=1
τk2 [n]
s.t.
M2∑
m2=1
xk2,m2 [n]
(
R¯k2,m2 [n]− R˜
up
k2,m2
[n]
)
− γk2 [n]
≥ τk2 [n] , n ∈ N , k2, (25)
γk2 [n] ≥
M2∑
m2=1
xk2,m2 [n]
(
R¯upk1,m2 [n]− R˜k1,m2 [n]
)
,
, n ∈ N , k1, k2, (26)
0 ≤ pi ≤ Pmax, i ∈ M1 ∪M2. (27)
(P2.1) is a convex optimization problem, which can be effi-
ciently solved by standard convex techniques. Consequently,
problem (P2) can be approximately solved by successively
updating the transmit power based on the results obtained from
(P2.1).
C. UAV trajectory optimization
In this subsection, we consider the third sub-problem of (P)
for optimizing UAV trajectory with given transmit power and
user scheduling. The SCA technique and Dinkelbach method
are used to solve this non-convex sub-problem. Furthermore,
the convex form does not obey the disciplined CVX rules
[42]. To solve this problem, we equivalently reformulate it
into recognized rules without loss of optimality.
6R˜k2,m2 [n] ≤Blog2

 ∑
i∈M2\{m2}∪M1
pri [n]hk2,i [n] + σ
2


+B
∑
i∈M2\{m2}∪M1
hk2,i [n] log2 (e)∑
j∈M2\{m2}∪M1
prj [n]hk2,j [n] + σ
2
(pi [n]− p
r
i [n])
a
= R˜upk2,m2 [n] . (22)
R¯k1,m2 [n] ≤Blog2
( ∑
i∈M1∪M2
pri [n]hk1,i [n] + σ
2
)
+B
∑
i∈M1∪M2
hk1,i [n] log2 (e)∑
j∈M1∪M1
prj [n]hk1,j [n] + σ
2
(pi [n]− p
r
i [n])
b
= R¯upk1,m2 [n] . (24)
For the given UAV transmit power P and user scheduling
X , the third sub-problem of (P) is simplified as
(P3) max
Q,Φk2[n],
ϕk2 [n]
K2∑
k2=1
N∑
n=1
Φk2 [n]
∑
i∈M1∪M2
N∑
n=1
c1‖vi [n]‖
3
+ c2‖vi[n]‖
(
1 + ‖ai[n]‖
2
g2
)
s.t. (10)-(15),
Rk2 [n]− ϕk2 [n] ≥ Φk2 [n] , n ∈ N , k2, (28)
ϕk2 [n] ≥ Rk1→k2 , n ∈ N , k1, k2, (29)
where Φk2 [n] and ϕk2 are the slack variables. Note that the
problem (P3) is non-convex due to the following reasons.
First, the UAV trajectory Q involved in (28) and (29) leads to
a non-convex constraint set. Second, the UAV velocity vi[n]
and acceleration ai[n] are coupled in the objective function.
Therefore, it is intractable to directly solve the problem (P3)
efficiently. In the following, we apply SCA technique and
Dinkelbach method to obtain the UAV trajectory. We first
reformulate (P3) by introducing slack variables {µi[n]} as
(P3.1) max
Q,Φk2 [n],
µi[n],ϕk2 [n]
K2∑
k2=1
N∑
n=1
Φk2 [n]
∑
i∈M1∪M2
N∑
n=1
c1‖vi [n]‖
3
+ c2
µi[n]
+ c2‖ai[n]‖
2
µi[n]g2
s.t. (10)-(15), (28), (29),
µi [n] ≥ 0, n ∈ N , i ∈M1 ∪M2, (30)
‖vi [n]‖
2 ≥ µi [n] , n ∈ N , i ∈ M1 ∪M2, (31)
It can be verified that at the optimal solution to the problem
(P3.1), we must have ‖vi [n]‖
2
= µi [n] , n ∈ N , i ∈
M1 ∪ M2, which means the problem (P3) is equivalent
to (P3.1). This can be proved by using reduction to absur-
dity. Suppose that at the optimal value to problem (P3.1),
‖vi [n]‖
2
> µi [n] , n ∈ N , i ∈ M1 ∪M2, one can always
appropriately increase µi[n] to obtain a strictly larger objective
value, which is contradictory to the assumption. Therefore,
problem (P3.1) is equivalent to (P3). Obviously, (31) is a non-
convex constraint. By applying the first-order Taylor expansion
at local point vri [n], we have
‖vi [n]‖
2 ≥‖vri [n]‖
2
+ 2(vri [n])
T
(vi [n]− v
r
i [n])
= Υlb (vi [n]) , n ∈ N , i ∈ M1 ∪M2, (32)
Subsequently, the constraint (31) can be rewritten as
Υlb (vi [n]) ≥ µi [n] , n ∈ N , i ∈ M1 ∪M2, (33)
which is convex since Υlb (vi [n]) is linear w.r.t. vi[n].
To tackle the non-convex constraint (28), the SAC technique
is leveraged. Specifically, by introducing auxiliary variables
{Sk2,i[n], n ∈ N , k2 ∈ K2, i ∈ M1 ∪M2} into R˜k2,m2 [n] in
(21), R˜k2,m2 [n] can be substituted as
˜˜Rk2,m2 [n] = Blog2

 ∑
i∈M2\{m2}∪M1
pi [n]β0
H2 + Sk2,i [n]
+ σ2

 ,
∀k2, n ∈ N ,m ∈M2, (34)
with additional constraint
Sk2,i [n] ≤ ‖qi[n]−wk2‖
2, ∀k2, n ∈ N , i ∈ M2\ {m2} ∪M1,
(35)
It is observed from (35) that ‖qi[n]−wk2 [n]‖
2 leads to a non-
convex constraint set. To handle the non-convexity of (35),
we have the following inequality by applying the first-order
Taylor expansion at the given local point ‖qri [n] − wk2‖ at
r-th iteration
‖qi[n]−wk2‖
2 ≥‖qri [n]−wk2‖
2
+ 2(qri [n]−wk2)
T
× (qi[n]− q
r
i [n]) = χ
lb (qi[n]) , (36)
which is convex since χlb(qi[n]) is linear w.r.t. qi[n].
Although
˜˜R is convex w.r.t. Sk2,i[n] in (34), it does not
obey the disciplined CVX rules.
Lemma 3: To make the problem (P3.1) efficiently solved
by CVX, (34) can be transformed into
˜˜˜
Rk2,m2 [n] = B̟[n], (37)
7with additional constraints

H2+Sk2,i[n]
pi[n]β0
≥ e−zk2,i[n], ∀k2, i ∈M2\ {m2} ∪M, n ∈ N ,
̟[n] ≥ log2
( ∑
i∈M2\{m2}∪M1
ezk2,i[n] + σ2
)
,
(38)
where zk2,i[n] and ̟[n] are the auxiliary variables. It can be
seen that both (37) and (38) are convex. However, R¯k2,m2 [n]
in (21) is not convex w.r.t. UAV trajectory qi[n] but convex
w.r.t. ‖qi[n]−wk2 [n]‖
2. Thus, we have the following result.
Lemma 4: With local point ‖qri [n] − wk2 [n]‖
2,
i ∈M1 ∪M2, ∀k2, over r-th iteration, the inequality
is hold in (39) (at the top of next page).
Proof: The proof is similar to Lemma 1 and omitted here
for simplicity.
Based on above transformations, the constraint (28) can be
reformulated as
M2∑
m2=1
xk2,m2 [n]
(
R¯lbk2,m2 [n]−
˜˜˜
Rk2,i[n]
)
− ϕk2 [n]
≥ Φk2 [n] , ∀n, k2. (40)
Next, by introducing auxiliary variables {Zk1,i[n], n ∈
N , ∀k1, i ∈ M1 ∪M2} into R¯k1,m2 [n] in (23), we deal with
the non-convex constraint (29), which can be substituted as
R¯k1,m2 [n] = Blog2
( ∑
i∈M1∪M2
pi [n]β0
H2 + Zk1,i [n]
+ σ2
)
,
∀k1, n ∈ N ,
(41)
with additional constraint
Zk1,i [n] ≤ ‖qi[n]−wk1‖
2
, ∀k1, n ∈ N, i ∈ M1 ∪M2.
(42)
For (42), by applying the first-order Taylor expansion at the
given local point ‖qri [n] −wk1‖ over r-th iteration, we have
the following inequality
‖qi[n]−wk1‖
2 ≥‖qri [n]−wk1‖
2 + 2(qri [n]−wk1)
T
× (qi[n]− q
r
i [n]) = Ξ
lb (qi[n]) . (43)
Note that (41) has same structure with (34), it can be refor-
mulated it as following disciplined CVX form
¯¯
Rk1,m2 [n] = B ¯̟ [n], (44)
with additional constraints

H2+Zk1,i[n]
pi[n]β0
≥ e−z¯k1,i[n], ∀k1, i ∈M1 ∪M2, n ∈ N ,
¯̟ [n] ≥ log2
( ∑
i∈M1∪M2
ez¯k1,i[n] + σ2
)
,
(45)
where z¯k1,i[n] and ¯̟ [n] are the auxiliary variables. It is worth
mentioning that in (23), R˜k1,m2 is neither convex nor concave
w.r.t. qi[n] while it is convex w.r.t. ‖qi[n]−wk1 [n]‖
2. Then,
we can obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 5: With given local point ‖qri [n] − wk1 [n]‖
2, i ∈
M2\ {m2} ∪ M1, over r-th iteration, the inequality is hold
in (46) (at the top of next page).
Proof: The proof is similar to Lemma 1 and omitted here
for simplicity.
Then, the constraint (29) can be rewritten as
ϕk2 [n] ≥
M2∑
m2=1
xk2,m2 [n]
(
¯¯
Rk1,m2 [n]− R˜
lb
k1,m2
[n]
)
,
n ∈ N , ∀k1, k2, (47)
By defining the auxiliary variables set Θ =
{(µi [n] , Sk2,i [n] , ̟, zk2,i [n] , Zk1,i [n] , ¯̟ , z¯k1,i [n])},
the problem (P3) can be simplified as
(P3.2) max
Q,Φk2 [n],
Θ,ϕk2 [n]
K2∑
k2=1
N∑
n=1
Φk2 [n]
∑
i∈M1∪M2
N∑
n=1
c1‖vi [n]‖
3 + c2
µi[n]
+ c2‖ai[n]‖
2
µi[n]g2
s.t. (10)-(15), (30), (33), (38), (40), (45), (47)
Sk2,i [n] ≤ χ
lb (qi[n]) , ∀k2, n ∈ N, i ∈M2\ {m2} ∪M1,
Zk1,i [n] ≤ Ξ
lb (qi[n]) , ∀k1, n ∈ N, i ∈M1 ∪M2.
It can be seen that problem (P3.2) is a fractional max-
imization problem with convex constraints, convex denomi-
nator and linear numerator, wherein Dinkelbach method can
be employed. For the analytic simplicity, define F as the
set of feasible points of problem (P3.2), and E˜total =∑
i∈M1∪M2
N∑
n=1
c1‖vi [n]‖
3
+ c2
µi[n]
+ ‖ai[n]‖
2
µi[n]g2
. In addition, by
defining ζ∗ as the maximum security energy efficiency, we
have
ζ∗ = max
Q,Φk2 [n],Θ,ϕk2 [n]
K2∑
k2=1
N∑
n=1
Φk2 [n]
E˜total
. (48)
Hence, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The optimal solutions of problem (P3.2)
achieve the maximum SEE value ζ∗ if and only if
max
Q,Φk2 [n],Θ,ϕk2 [n]
K2∑
k2=1
N∑
n=1
Φk2 [n]− ζ
∗E˜total = 0. (49)
Proof: The proof can be referred to [43]–[45].
Then, we can rewrite the problem (P3.2) as
(P3.3) max
Q,Φk2 [n],Θ,ϕk2 [n]
K2∑
k2=1
N∑
n=1
Φk2 [n]− ζE˜total
s.t. (10)-(15), (30), (33), (38), (40), (45), (47),
Sk2,i [n] ≤ χ
lb (qi[n]) , ∀k2, n ∈ N, i ∈ M2\ {m2} ∪M1,
Zk1,i [n] ≤ Ξ
lb (qi[n]) , ∀k1, n ∈ N, i ∈ M1 ∪M2.
Finally, an iterative algorithm, namely Dinkelbach method
[43], is proposed for solving problem (P3.2), which is sum-
marized in Algorithm 2. It is worth pointing out that the global
optimality can be guaranteed by using Dinkelbach method. As
a consequence, the problem (P3.2) can be optimally solved by
8R¯k2,m2 [n] ≥Blog2
( ∑
i∈M1∪M2
pi [n]β0
H2 + ‖qri [n]−wk2‖
2
)
−
B
∑
i∈M1∪M2
pi[n]β0(
H2+‖qri [n]−wk2‖
2
)2 log2 (e)∑
j∈M1∪M2
pj [n]β0
H2+‖qrj [n]−wk2‖
2
(
‖qi [n]−wk2‖
2 − ‖qri [n]−wk2‖
2
)
△
= R¯lbk2,m2 [n] . (39)
R˜k1,m2 [n] ≥ Blog2

 ∑
i∈M2\{m2}∪M1
pi [n]β0
H2 + ‖qri [n]−wk1‖
2


−B
∑
i∈M2\{m2}∪M1
pi[n]β0(
H2+‖qri [n]−wk1‖
2
)2 log2 (e)∑
j∈M2\{m2}∪M1
pj [n]β0
H2+‖qrj [n]−wk1‖
2
(
‖qi [n]−wk1‖
2 − ‖qri [n]−wk1‖
2
)
△
= R˜lbk1,m2 [n] . (46)
using Algorithm 2, and problem (P3) can be approximately
solved by successively updating the UAV trajectory based on
the optimal solution to problem (P3.2).
Algorithm 2 Dinkelbach method for solving problem (P3.2)
1: Initialization: the maximum tolerance ǫ, ζ = 0 and
iteration index t.
2: Repeat
3: Solve problem (P3.3) with a given ζ, denote {Q∗,
Φ∗k2 [n] ,Θ
∗, ϕ∗k2 [n]} as obtained optimal solutions.
4: if
K2∑
k2=1
N∑
n=1
Φ∗k2 [n]− ζE˜
∗
total ≤ ǫ then
5: Convergence=true.
6: Output
{
Q∗,Φ∗k2 [n] ,Θ
∗, ϕ∗k2 [n]
}
and
ζ∗ =
K2∑
k2=1
N∑
n=1
Φ∗k2 [n]
E˜∗
total
.
7: else
8: Set ζ∗ =
K2∑
k2=1
N∑
n=1
Φk2 [n]
E˜total
and t = t+ 1.
9: ζ = ζ∗.
10: Convergence=false.
11: end if
12: Until Convergence=true.
D. Overall iterative algorithm
In this subsection, we solve problem (P) by using the
block coordinate descent method [46]. Specifically, in the l-th
iteration, we first obtain the optimal user schedulingX∗l+1 with
any given transmit power Pl and UAV trajectory Ql by solving
problem (P1). Next, the optimal transmit power P ∗l+1 with any
given user schedulingX∗l+1 and UAV trajectory Ql is obtained
by solving problem (P2). Then, the optimal UAV trajectory
Q∗l+1 with any given user schedulingX
∗
l+1 and transmit power
P ∗l+1 is obtained by solving problem (P3). The details of this
algorithm are summarized in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Block coordinate descent method for solving
problem (P)
1: Initialization: the maximum tolerance ǫ, UAV trajectory
Q0, transmit power P0 and iteration index l.
2: Repeat
3: Solve problem (P1) for any given transmit power Pl
and UAV trajectoryQl, and denote the obtained optimal
user scheduling as X∗l+1.
4: Solve problem (P2) for any given user schedulingX∗l+1
and UAV trajectoryQl, and denote the obtained optimal
transmit power as P ∗l+1.
5: Solve problem (P3) for any given user schedulingX∗l+1
and transmit power P ∗l+1, and denote the obtained UAV
trajectory as Q∗l+1.
6: Update l = l + 1.
7: Until the fractional increase of the objective value of (P)
is less than tolerance ǫ.
Next, a brief illustration of the convergence property of
the Algorithm 3 is discussed. Let us define the objective
value of problem (P1), (P2) and (P3) over l-th iteration as
R1(Xl, Pl, Ql), R2(Xl, Pl, Ql) and EE(Xl, Pl, Ql), respec-
tively. Then, at the l+1-th iteration, we have the relationships
as (50) (at the top of the next page). In (50), the inequalities
a, c and e follow the fact that the optimal results are obtained
by problem (P1), (P2) and (P3), respectively. The formula
(50) indicates that Algorithm 3 is non-decreasing over each
iteration. Apart from this, since the objective value of problem
(P) is upper bounded by a finite value, Algorithm 3 is thus
guaranteed to converge.
In Algorithm 3, the computational complexity of solving
(P1) is O
(
N
(
2K2M2 + Cm¯y2Nm¯
y
2
))
. For problem (P2), it
involves logarithmic constraints, which can be approximated
as linear constraints by taking first-order Taylor expansion.
Then the problem becomes a linear problem and can
be solved by interior point method with computational
complexity O
(√
(M1+M2)N+2K2N log
1
ε0
)
, where
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SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
Channel gain: β0 −60dB [13]
Noise power: σ2 −110dBm [13]
Duration of each time slot: δ 0.5s [33]
System bandwidth: B 1MHz [33]
UAV altitude: H 100m [33]
UAV maximum transmit power: Pmax 1W [8]
UAV maximum speed: vmax 50m/s [13]
UAV maximum acceleration: amax 5m/s2 [33]
UAV energy consumption coefficient: c1 9.26× 10−4 [33]
UAV energy consumption coefficient: c2 2250 [33]
Maximum tolerance: ǫ 10−2
(M1+M2)N+2K2N denotes the decision variables,
and ε0 denotes iterative accuracy [47]. Similarly
to (P2), the computational complexity of (P3) is
O
(
L1
(√
4N + (2K1 + 2K2 +N) (M1 +M2) log
1
ε0
))
,
where L1 denotes the iteration numbers for
updating ζ in Algorithm 2. Thus, the overall
computational complexity of Algorithm 3 is
O
(
L1
(√
4N + (2K1 + 2K2 +N) (M1 +M2) log
1
ε0
)
+√
(M1+M2)N+2K2N log
1
ε0
+N
(
2K2M2 + Cm¯y2Nm¯
y
2
))
.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, numerical simulations are provided to evalu-
ate the performance of our proposed scheme. Unless otherwise
specified, the corresponding parameter values are summarized
in Table I. As will be described later, we consider several
network scenarios to study our proposed schemes.
A. Single SUAV Case
We first consider one UAV case, where a single SUAV
serves multiple legitimate users in the presence of one eaves-
dropper without the help of JUAV. Fig. 2 shows the optimized
UAV trajectories projected onto the horizontal plane for the
different period T . As expected, the UAV prefers moving
closer to the legitimate users and far away from the eaves-
dropper to improve the system’s secrecy rate. Meanwhile, we
can also see that the UAV trajectories are smooth since it is
in general less power-consuming [33].
To show the superiority of our proposed scheme in terms of
SEE of UAV systems, we consider the following benchmark
schemes:
• Optimized SEE maximization scheme: This is our
proposed scheme obtained from Algorithm 3 by jointly
optimizing the UAV transmit power, user scheduling and
UAV trajectory.
• SEE maximization with circular path scheme: For
this scheme, the UAV flies with a circular path (initial
trajectory). The SEE of UAV systems is obtained by
jointly optimizing the UAV transmit power and user
scheduling.
• UAV energy consumption minimization scheme: For
this scheme, we first obtain the optimized UAV trajectory
via minimizing the UAV propulsion energy consumption.
Then, with the obtained UAV trajectory, the secrecy rate
is optimized by jointly optimizing the UAV transmit
power and user scheduling.
• Secrecy rate maximization scheme: The UAV energy
consumption is not optimized in this scheme. Our aim
is to maximize the secrecy rate by jointly optimizing the
UAV transmit power, user scheduling and UAV trajectory.
It is observed from Fig. 3 that for our proposed scheme, the
SEE first monotonically increases, and then monotonically
decreases with period T . This is due to the fact that in the
first phase, the incremental of UAV energy consumption is
no larger than the incremental of secrecy rate as period T is
small, thus increases the system SEE. In the second phase,
the incremental of UAV energy consumption is dramatically
increased compared with the incremental of secrecy rate as
period T becomes larger, thus decreases the system SEE.
In addition, we can see that our proposed scheme achieves
significantly higher SEE as compared with the benchmarks,
which demonstrates the superiority of our proposed scheme.
B. One SUAV and One JUAV Case
In this subsection, we consider two UAVs case, where one
SUAV and one JUAV simultaneously serve two legitimate
users in the presence of one eavesdropper. Evidently, the trans-
mit power of SUAV and JUAV should be carefully designed as
the secrecy rate performance of UAV systems will be degraded
by the interference imposed by JUAV.
We plot the optimized SUAV trajectory and JUAV ob-
tained from Algorithm 3. It is observed from Fig. 4 that
both optimized trajectories are rather similar to the circular
trajectory, which has the same result in [33]. In addition, the
SUAV prefers moving closer to the legitimate user for data
transmitting and JUAV prefers moving closer to eavesdropper
to impose strong interference on eavesdropper. Fig. 5 shows
that as the SUAV is closer to user 1, the SUAV will transmit
information data to user 1 rather than user 2. Similarly, as the
SUAV moves closer to user 2, the SUAV tends to transmit
information data to user 2 rather than user 1. Fig. 6 shows
the power transmit of SUAV and JUAV, as expected, when
the SUAV moves from the legitimate user to eavesdropper,
less power is allocated. Besides, more JUAV power is trans-
mitted when the SUAV flies closer to the eavesdropper. This
is because when the eavesdropper-SUAV channel is good,
the stronger jamming signal power needs to be transmitted
to interfere the eavesdropper and less power of SUAV is
transmitted to prevent the data information wiretapped by the
eavesdropper.
Fig. 7 depicts the secrecy rate performance with different
period T . We compare the following two schemes, namely no
cooperative JUAV scheme as well as no trajectory optimization
scheme (circular trajectory). Clearly, the secrecy rate is mono-
tonically increasing with time T . In addition, our proposed
scheme achieves a significant higher secrecy rate than the
other two benchmarks, which means the UAV trajectory has
prominent impacts on the performance of secrecy rate. Also,
for the no cooperative JUAV scheme, the system secrecy rate
performance is poor, which indicates that JUAV indeed can
bring the performance gain.
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EE (Xl, Pl, Ql) =
R1 (Xl, Pl, Ql)
Etotal (Ql)
a
≤
R1 (Xl+1, Pl, Ql)
Etotal (Ql)
=
R2 (Xl+1, Pl, Ql)
Etotal (Ql)
b
≤
R2 (Xl+1, Pl+1, Ql)
Etotal (Ql)
= EE (Xl+1, Pl, Ql)
c
≤ EE (Xl+1, Pl+1, Ql+1) . (50)
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Fig. 2. Optimized UAV trajectories for different period T with a single SUAV.
Each optimized trajectory is sampled every 5s and the sampled points are
marked with△. The direction of arrow is the direction of the initial trajectory.
The legitimate users locations are marked by  and the eavesdropper location
is marked by +. In addition, the initial location of UAV is marked by •.
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Fig. 3. The SEE comparison of different schemes in scenario A.
In the next, we have performed the new simulations to show
the UAV energy consumption of our proposed SEE scheme as
compared to other benchmarks. In Fig. 8, it is observed that for
secrecy rate maximization scheme, the UAV consumes a large
amount of propulsion energy compared with SEE scheme and
UAV energy consumption minimization scheme. In addition,
the gap between SEE scheme and UAV energy consump-
tion minimization scheme is small, which indicates that the
proposed SEE scheme strikes an optimal balance between
maximizing the secrecy achievable rate and minimizing the
UAV’s propulsion energy consumption. In Fig. 9, we compare
the SEE achieved by the four schemes. Similar results can
be obtained from Fig. 3, the detailed explanations are omitted
here.
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Fig. 4. Optimized SUAV trajectory and JUAV trajectory for period T = 80s.
Each optimized trajectory is sampled every 5s and the sampled points are
marked with△. The direction of arrow is the direction of the initial trajectory.
The legitimate users locations are marked by  and the eavesdropper location
is marked by +. In addition, the initial location of UAV is marked by •.
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Fig. 5. UAV-user scheduling for period T = 80s.
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Fig. 6. UAV transmit power for period T = 80s.
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Fig. 8. UAV energy consumption versus period T for the One SUAV and
One JUAV Case with different schemes.
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Fig. 9. The SEE comparison of different schemes in scenario B.
C. Multi-SUAV and Multi-JUAV Case
A more general case of two SUAVs and two JUAVs to serve
multiple legitimate users in the presence of two eavesdroppers
is considered in this subsection. Fig. 10 depicts the optimized
SUAV and JUAV trajectories obtained by using Algorithm
3. It is observed from Fig. 10 that the trajectories between
SUAV 1 and JUAV 2 or (SUAV 2 and JUAV 1) tend to
keep away to alleviate the co-channel interference. Meanwhile,
the co-channel interference may be beneficial for the secure
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Fig. 10. Optimized two SUAV trajectories and two JUAV trajectories for
period T = 80s. Each optimized trajectory is sampled every 5s and the
sampled points are marked with △. The solid circles are the UAV initial
trajectories with same color corresponding its optimized UAV trajectories.
The direction of arrow is the direction of the initial trajectory. The legitimate
users locations are marked by  and the eavesdropper location is marked by
+. In addition, the initial location of UAV is marked by •.
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Fig. 11. UAV transmit power with SUAV and JUAV for period T = 80s.
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Fig. 12. Secrecy rate performance of two SUAVs and two JUAVs versus
different period T .
UAV system by appropriately imposing the jamming signal
to the eavesdroppers. The corresponding SUAVs and JUAVs
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Fig. 13. UAV energy consumption versus period T for the Multi-SUAV and
Multi-JUAV Case with different schemes.
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Fig. 14. The SEE comparison of different schemes in in scenario C.
transmit power versus period T are plotted in Fig. 11. First,
it is observed that when the distance between legitimate user
and eavesdropper is not long (e.g., the legitimate user 1 and
eavesdropper 1), the SUAV tends to move closer to legitimate
user with less SUAV transmit power and meanwhile the JUAV
transmits higher power. Second, when the distance between
legitimate user and eavesdropper is long (e.g., the legitimate
user 2 and eavesdropper 1), the SUAV tends to move closer
to the legitimate user with higher transmit power in order to
improve the secrecy rate.
In Fig. 12, the secrecy rate achieved by the various schemes
versus period T is plotted. It is first found that our optimized
trajectory scheme significantly outperforms the circular tra-
jectory scheme as well as no cooperative JUAVs transmission
scheme. In Fig. 13, We plot the UAV energy consumption
with different schemes under different period time T . We can
obtain similar insights in Fig. 8, which further demonstrate its
correction. Furthermore, the system SEE performance against
SEE maximization with circular path scheme, UAV energy
consumption minimization scheme and secrecy rate maximiza-
tion scheme are shown in Fig. 14. It can be still observed that
our proposed scheme achieves significant gain compared with
these three benchmarks in terms of SEE. In addition, we can
see that the trend of curves in Fig. 14 is similar with Fig. 9,
which indicates there exist a fundamental tradeoff between
secrecy rate and UAV power consumption.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the energy-efficient multi-UAV en-
abled secure transmission wireless systems by considering the
UAVs’ propulsion energy consumption and users’ secure rate
simultaneously. We aim at maximizing the SEE of UAV sys-
tems by jointly optimizing the user scheduling, transmit power
and UAV trajectory. Then, an efficient three-layer iterative
algorithm is proposed to solve the formulated non-convex
and integer fractional problem based on block coordinate
descent and Dinkelbach method, as well as SCA techniques.
Numerical results show that the UAV mobility is beneficial
for achieving higher secure rate than the other benchmarks
without considering trajectory optimization. Moreover, three
useful insights are extracted from numerical results. First,
our proposed JUAVs-aided secrecy rate maximization scheme
achieves significantly higher secrecy rate compared with no
JUAVs-aided secure scheme. Second, the UAV-enabled SEE
does not monotonically increase or decrease with period time
T , in contrast, the UAV-enabled SEE is firstly increasing with
period T and then decreasing with period time T . This is
different with the secrecy rate maximization scheme and com-
mon throughput maximization as in [13]. Third, our proposed
SEE scheme gains significantly higher energy efficiency than
that of the energy-minimization and secrecy rate maximization
schemes.
There are still many other research directions can further
extend this work. 1) We model the A2G channel as free path
loss for simplicity, the more practical channels such as Rician
and Nakagami-m fading can be considered in the future work.
2) The design of UAV altitude can be further exploited, and
how to efficiently optimize the joint UAV altitude, transmit
power, user scheduling and UAV trajectory is also worthy of
investigation. 3) This paper considers the fixed wing UAV,
the other types of UAVs such as the rotary wing UAV has the
different energy consumption as well as UAV trajectory model,
and it is still worthy of investigation. 4) Some literatures have
paid attention to investigating the imperfect location of the
eavesdropper scenario [48]–[50], and how to extend it in our
scenario is an interesting work.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
For the sake simplicity, we first define a function
f (x1, . . . , xN ) = log2
(
N∑
i=1
aixi + b
)
, where xi, ai, and
b are all positive, ∀i. It is not difficult to verify that
f (x1, . . . , xN ) is concave w.r.t. xi, ∀i, by checking its cor-
responding Hessian matrix. Recall that the first-order Tay-
lor expansion of a concave function is its global over-
estimator [51], i.e., f (x1, . . . , xN ) ≤ f
(
x01, . . . , x
0
N
)
+
13
N∑
i=1
f ′xi
(
x01, . . . , x
0
N
) (
xi − x0i
)
, where x0i , ∀i, denotes the
feasible point. Thus, we have the following inequality
log2
(
N∑
i=1
aixi + b
)
≤ log2
(
N∑
i=1
aix
0
i + b
)
+
N∑
i=1
ailog2e
N∑
j=1
ajx0j + b
(
xi − x
0
i
)
. (51)
Therefore, (22) follows from (51) by setting N =
M2\ {m2} ∪M1, ai = hk2,i[n], xi = pi[n], x
0
i = p
r
i [n]
and b = δ2. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
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